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Abstract 
Mind wandering is typically operationalized as task-unrelated thought. Some argue for 
the need to distinguish between unintentional and intentional mind wandering, where an 
agent voluntarily shifts attention from task-related to task-unrelated thoughts. We reveal 
an inconsistency between the standard, task-unrelated thought definition of mind 
wandering and the occurrence of intentional mind wandering (together with plausible 
assumptions about tasks and intentions). This suggests that either the standard definition 
of mind wandering should be rejected or that intentional mind wandering is an incoherent 
category. Solving this puzzle is critical for advancing theoretical frameworks of mind 
wandering. 
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0. Introduction 
There has been a surge of interest in mind wandering in psychology (see Smallwood & 
Schooler, 2015 for a review) and, more recently, philosophy (Dorsch, 2015; Irving, 2016; 
Metzinger, 2013; Sripada, 2018). Mind wandering is typically defined as task-unrelated 
thought in psychological research.1 More precisely, an agent mind wanders when and 
	
1 Mills et al., 2018 found that over 90% of papers published on mind wandering in 2016 assumed 
(implicitly or explicitly) the task-unrelated thought definition of mind wandering (Mills and colleagues do 
not, however, endorse the task-unrelated thought conception of mind wandering in their survey). Seli and 
colleagues confirm this in their recent theoretical piece on mind wandering: “To date, the most common 
definitions of mind-wandering include task-unrelated thought…and stimulus-indpendent task-unrelated 
thought” (Seli et al., 2018-b: 479-80). Additionally, one of the earliest theoretical discussions of mind 
wandering proposed something close to a task-unrelated thought conception of mind wandering 
(Smallwood & Schooler, 2006; cf. Giambra, 1995). This same conception was reiterated in a later review 
piece summarizing ten years of work on mind wandering (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). 
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only when that agent has a task-unrelated, stimulus independent thought. We will refer to 
this as the Standard View.2 
 Some have recently argued for a distinction between unintentional and intentional 
mind wandering, where some agent either involuntarily shifts attention to task-unrelated 
thoughts or, instead, can engage higher order, deliberate control and choose to shift 
attention (e.g., Seli, Risko, & Smilek, 2016; Seli, Risko, Smilek, & Schacter, 2016; 
Irving, Manuscript). The basis of the distinction is that these two kinds of mind 
wandering seem to independently predict variables of interest (Seli, Risko, & Smilek, 
2016). This is potentially significant for the empirical study of mind wandering, as 
models of mind wandering would have to accommodate the occurrence of intentional 
mind wandering.  
 This is also potentially significant for philosophical views of mind wandering and 
certain philosophical conceptions of action. Recently, some have suggested that mind 
wandering is inherently passive despite possessing some characteristics of activity 
(Irving, 2016: 549-50). Because mind wandering is inherently passive, if there is such a 
thing as intentional mind wandering, then it would seem to be a prime example of mental 
behavior that lies somewhere between pure passivity and pure activity.  
 We argue that things are not so simple. We generate a contradiction from the 
combination of the Standard View and the fact that intentional mind wandering occurs 
(together with some innocent assumptions about tasks and intentions). This shows that 
either the Standard View should be rejected or that intentional mind wandering is an 
incoherent category. 	
2 The Standard View is not so standard among philosophers. Philosophical inquiry into mind wandering is 
relatively young, however, so we do not think there is any standard view on the matter among philosophers.  
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1.  The Puzzle 
We argue in this section that the construct of intentional mind wandering is inconsistent 
with the Standard View. We call this the Puzzle of Willful Wandering (PWW). 
Informally, PWW shows that an agent cannot intend to have task-unrelated thoughts, as 
intending to have any thought thereby makes that thought related to one’s task. Thus, the 
thoughts cannot be task-unrelated and so cannot constitute mind wandering in the 
standard sense: 
PWW-1 S is mind wandering when and only when S has at least one task-
unrelated thought 
Premise 
PWW-2 S is able to intentionally mind wander Supposition 
PWW-3 Intentionally A-ing requires either a proximal intention to A or some 
intention to B where A-ing is within the motivational potential to B 
Premise 
PWW-4 Some activity is within the motivational potential of an intention to B 
only if that activity is a constitutive means of B-ing or is an expected 
side effect of B-ing. 
Premise 
PWW-5 Hence, S has either a proximal intention to mind wander or an 
intention to B where mind wandering is a constitutive means of B-ing 
or is an expected side effect of B-ing. 
2, 3, 4 
PWW-6 If S proximally intends to A, then A-ing becomes S’s task. Premise 
PWW-7 If S proximally intends to mind wander, then mind wandering 
becomes S’s task. 
5, Instance 
of 6 
PWW-8 An agent’s thought is task-related when and only when that thought 
contributes to her task performance. 
Premise 
PWW-9 Trivially, thoughts during mind wandering contribute to mind 
wandering. 
Premise 
PWW-10 Hence, if S proximally intends to mind wander, then S’s mind 
wandering is task-related. 
6, 7, 8, 9 
PWW-11 Therefore, S does not proximally intend to mind wander. 1, 5, 10 
PWW-12 If S’s mind wandering is a constitutive means of her B-ing, then her 
task-unrelated thought is necessary for her B-ing. 
Premise 
PWW-13 A thought unrelated to B-ing is not necessary for B-ing. Premise 
PWW-14 Hence, S’s mind wandering is not a constitutive means of her B-ing. 1, 5, 12, 13 
PWW-15 If S’s mind wandering is an expected side effect of her B-ing, then S 
must be able, on some occasion, to proximally intend to mind wander. 
Premise 
PWW-16 S’s mind wandering is not an expected side effect of her B-ing. 11, 15 
PWW-17 Contradiction 5, 11, 14, 16 
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In the following sections, we consider some flawed responses to the puzzle and suggest 
that either PWW-1 or PWW-2 is false.  
 
2. Intentionality and Motivational Potential (PWW-3) 
Consider PWW-3, which makes a claim about the nature of intentionality in action. This 
claim is typically considered to be part of the Planning Theory of Intention, first proposed 
and systematically developed by Michael Bratman (1984, 1987). According to the 
Planning Theory, there are two ways for behaviors to be intentional actions. To see this, 
consider an example of a person moving their foot. On the Planning Theory, one way for 
the foot motion to be intentional is for the agent to proximally intend to move their foot 
(and that proximal intention causes the foot to move in the right sort of way). The 
Planning Theory, however, also allows for intentional actions in the absence of any such 
tight connection between behavior and intentions. So, suppose that moving the foot is just 
one step in walking across campus on the way home. In this case, the agent does not (or 
need not) intend to move their foot, yet, moving the foot is part of executing the larger 
(intended) action of getting home. This is what makes moving the foot intentional. 
Moving the foot inherits intentionality in virtue of being a component in this larger 
intended plan.  
 More formally, the Planning Theory of Intention states that an agent can 
intentionally A without intending to A only if the agent intends to B, and her A-ing falls 
within the motivational potential of the agent’s intention to B (cf. Bratman, 1987: 216-
17). The notion of motivational potential is central to Bratman’s distinction, but Bratman 
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does not provide a precise characterization of this notion.3 He suggests that an agent’s A-
ing is within the motivational potential of an intention to B only if the agent’s executing 
her intention to B causes her to engage in A-ing and the agent believes that her A-ing 
contributes to executing her intention to B (Bratman, 1987: 123). The thoughts or 
behaviors that fall within the motivational potential of an intention are expected side 
effects of executing the intention or the constitutive means of executing an intention 
(Bratman, 1984: 399-401).  
One reason to use the Planning Theory of Intention in generating PWW is that 
this theory of intentionality in action is weaker than other accounts that count some 
behavior as intentional only if an agent acquires an intention to perform that behavior (cf. 
Amaya, 2018). If PWW works with a relatively weak theory of intentionality in action, 
we assume that stronger theories will also generate PWW. Additionally, replacing the 
Planning Theory with anything weaker risks adopting an implausibly weak theory of 
intentionality in action that might overgeneralize the scope of intentional action.4 For this 
reason, we think that rejecting PWW-3 is unlikely to furnish a reasonable solution to 
PWW.5   
	
3 Bratman himself acknowledges this: “The notion of motivational potential is intended to mark the fact 
that my intention to B may issue in my intentionally A-ing, rather than to explain it. It is a theoretical 
placeholder: it allows us to retain theoretical room for a more complex account of the relation between 
intention and intentional action while leaving unsettle the details of such an account” (emphasis original; 
1987: 120). 
4 Another consideration that speaks in favor of the Planning Theory of Intention is the widespread influence 
of the theory. Bratman’s planning theory has been widely adopted and has exerted influence in cognitive 
science, clinical domains, artificial intelligence, primatology and other fields (Yaffe & Vargas, 2014 
provide an overview of the influence of the Planning Theory of Intention). Hence, rejecting PWW-3 comes 
at the price of rejecting a view that has cross-disciplinary appeal. While this is not a decisive consideration, 
it does provide further reason to think that an alternative theory of intentionality in action is obviously 
preferable to targeting other premises of PWW. 
5 Some have recently challenged PWW-3 on the grounds that there can be intentional action without prior 
intentions (Herdova, 2018). This challenge focuses on the possibility of snap decisions, spontaneous 
actions, or habitual actions which are intentional without being triggered by a proximal intention. While the 
challenge is too complicated to address in full, we are skeptical that the cases used to formulate the 
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3. Side Effects (PWW-15) 
 PWW-15 states that an expected side effect, E, of intending to B is intentional 
only if it is the case that an agent could proximally intend to E. The motivation for the 
principle stems from wanting intentionality to distribute out in ways that map onto an 
agent’s foresight. For example, suppose you are on a sinking ship and you intentionally 
take the last lifeboat, knowing full well that this will leave others onboard stranded. In 
this case, it seems intuitive that you have also intentionally killed the people on the ship. 
When an agent intends to take a certain course of action—and foresees that there are 
certain consequences of taking that course of action—then some of those foreseen 
consequences inherit intentionality from the intention to take the course of action (see 
Aune, 1966). 
 We do not, however, want intentionality to distribute too pervasively into 
foreseen consequences. Hence, we need some principle to determine when foreseen 
consequences inherit intentionality and when they do not. PWW-15 states one such 
principle. PWW-15 is plausible because it explains some of our intuitions about the 
distribution of intentionality in action. You can intentionally rest your head on a pillow, 
but that does not make falling asleep intentional.6 PWW-15 explains why this is the case. 
Because one cannot proximally intend to fall asleep, falling asleep is not the right kind of 
activity to inherit intentionality from prior intentions. 
	
challenge occur without proximal intentions. For example, consider the case of beginning to whistle a tune 
on a whim. In this case, perhaps having a song stuck in one’s head, combined with beliefs about the context 
and relevant feelings, might contribute to acquiring an intention (where acquiring an intention does not 
require any decision). A full discussion of the challenge and a response can be found in Mele, Forthcoming. 
6 See Mele, 2009: 18-19. 
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 PWW-15 also resolves some action theoretic dilemmas. Consider Butler’s (1978: 
113) statement of Analysis “Problem” No. 16: 
If Brown in an ordinary game of dice hopes to throw a six and does so, we 
do not say that he threw the six intentionally. On the other hand if Brown 
puts one live cartridge into a six-chambered revolver, spins the chamber as 
he aims it at Smith and pulls the trigger hoping to kill Smith, we would 
say if he succeeded that he had killed Smith intentionally. How can this be 
so, since in both cases the probability of the desired result is the same? 
 
According to PWW-15, Brown does not throw a six intentionally because the throwing of 
a six is not an action that Brown can proximally intend to perform. Brown’s killing of 
Smith, however, does inherit intentionality from Brown’s intending to shoot Smith 
because the killing of Smith is something that Brown can proximally intend to perform.7 
 PWW-15, then, is a plausible principle that explains why some of the 
consequences or side effects of intentional action fail to inherit intentionality. If, 
however, the argument from PWW-1 to -11 is correct, then mind wandering is not the 
right sort of activity to inherit intentionality. Thus, solving PWW by denying PWW-15 
either requires some solution to earlier parts of the puzzle or some new principle that 
states the conditions under which intentionality distributes out to side effects. 
 
4. Intentional Wandering? 
We think that rejecting any of the premises discussed thus far produces an unattractive 
solution to PWW. The puzzle thus exploits the apparent paradox of intentional 
wandering, or aiming to do some activity that is inherently aimless.8 This suggests that 
	
7 This echoes both Ross (1978) and Kraemer’s (1978) solutions to Analysis Problem No. 16, both of whom 
appeal to differences of control to explain the asymmetry between dice-rolling and shooting. PWW-15, 
then, might be read as offering an interpretation of what control amounts to in this kind of situation. 
8 Consider, e.g., Irving (2016: 549-50): “It seems essential that mind-wandering lacks purpose; almost by 
definition, it contrasts with goal-directed forms of cognition like planning a trip or solving a crossword. 
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the problematic premise will be one of those that discuss the nature of intentionality and 
wandering (namely, PWW-1 and -2). 
 What our puzzle shows is that either the Standard View is incorrect or that 
intentional mind wandering is an incoherent category. The issue is that the Standard View 
defines mind wandering partly in terms of task-relatedness. The argument thus far shows 
that intentionally A-ing requires an agent to have A-related thoughts (this, we take it, is 
the upshot of the argument from PWW-6 to PWW-10). Thus, the Standard View rules out 
the possibility of intentional mind wandering. 
 We believe that there are two potential responses to PWW. One is to reject the 
Standard View, while the other is to reject the possibility of intentional mind wandering. 
We do not want to weigh decisively in favor of one response; instead, we want to explore 
the implications of each response, leaving aside full consideration of either possibility for 
another occasion. 
 
4.1 Rejecting the Standard View 
 One response to PWW is to reject the Standard View (PWW-1), which would add 
to a growing list of objections to the Standard View (see Andrews-Hanna et al. 2018; 
Christoff et al., 2016; Irving, 2016; Irving & Thompson, 2018; Seli et al., 2018-b; 
Sripada, 2018). Alternative theories of mind wandering, such as the Family 
Resemblances view or the Dynamic view (discussed below), would also enjoy a 
theoretical advantage over their Standard View counterparts. So, PWW presents 
additional ammunition for those who object to the Standard View, but it also has 	
Consider the term ‘mind-wandering’ itself. Wandering is purposeless movement…To say that someone’s 
mind is wandering, then, implies that her thinking is purposeless; it is not developing toward a goal or end-
point.” 
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interesting implications for both the Family Resemblances view and the Dynamic view, 
both of which we discuss next. 
 The Family Resemblances view claims that mind wandering is a heterogeneous 
construct with multiple, overlapping attributes that no single instance of mind wandering 
fully exemplifies (Seli et al., 2018-b: 482-84). Therefore, this view rejects the idea that 
there is any suitable necessary-and-sufficient-condition definition of mind wandering (see 
Seli et al., 2018-b: 482). Prototypical instances of mind wandering exhibit task-
unrelatedness, but not all instances share this property. For this reason, the Family 
Resemblances view conflicts with the Standard View. The Family Resemblances view 
accepts that some instances of mind wandering might not be task-unrelated, which the 
Standard View takes to be a necessary feature of mind wandering. Further, the Family 
Resemblances view claims that different features of mind wandering are orthogonal, such 
as task-unrelatedness and intentionality (see Seli et al., 2018-b: 483). Hence, those 
working within the Family Resemblances framework sometimes talk about intentional 
task-unrelated thought (see, e.g., Martel et al., In Preparation). PWW shows, however, 
that these features are not orthogonal, as the task-unrelated feature of mind wandering is 
incompatible with the intentionality feature. Thus, PWW shows that intentional task-
unrelated thought is impossible, which we take to be an interesting implication for the 
Family Resemblances view. 
 The Dynamic view of mind wandering defines mind wandering in terms of the 
relations between mental states rather than relations between some mental state and a 
task. Thus, Dynamic theories of mind wandering characterize it as unguided thought 
(Irving, 2016) or as relatively unconstrained thought (Christoff et al., 2016). These 
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theories can actually explain how intentional mind wandering is possible. For example, 
Irving (Manuscript) argues that intentional mind wandering consists in thinking that is 
not guided toward any particular goal. However, individuals retain meta-control over 
episodes of intentional mind wandering. As Irving describes it, one exercises meta-
control over intentional mind wandering when: “…one actively initiates or maintains an 
unguided mode of thought, while exerting no control over where your attention is 
directed” (Manuscript: 13). 
 PWW tells us something important about this view of intentional mind 
wandering. As we argued in Section 3, proximally intending to mind wander is 
impossible, where an agent’s proximally intending to A issues immediately in her 
undertaking to A. Thus, intentional mind wandering cannot reflect intentionally initiating 
a mind wandering sequence; rather, intentional mind wandering must reflect intentionally 
maintaining one’s mind wandering (see Irving, Manuscript).9 This suggests an interesting 
possibility. People cannot intentionally begin to mind wander, though they can 
intentionally maintain themselves in a state of mind wandering. 
 We think that there is much more to say here. We raise these issues merely to 
illustrate the utility of PWW beyond demonstrating an incompatibility between the 
Standard View and the possibility of intentional mind wandering. Even those who 
already reject the Standard View can take something interesting away from PWW. 
 
4.2 Rejecting Intentional Mind Wandering 	
9 A suggestive, though not decisive, argument for this claim can be made. Any activity that one can 
intentionally initiate is such that the agent could, on command, immediately undertake to perform that 
activity. No one, however, can mind wander on command (it is possible to put oneself in a position where 
mind wandering is likely, but this does not amount to following a command to mind wander immediately). 
So, mind wandering is not among those activities that one can intentionally initiate. 
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Another potential response to PWW is to reject the possibility of intentional mind 
wandering (PWW-2). This might seem implausible, as there is substantial, and growing, 
evidence for intentional mind wandering. However, we sketch out some reasons for 
reframing this evidence to support an alternative (weaker) hypothesis consistent with 
rejecting the possibility of intentional mind wandering. Roughly, we believe that the 
evidence suggests the need for distinguishing mind wandering from related cognitive 
activity that superficially resemble mind wandering. These related activities might be 
focused daydreaming, motivated task-switching, personal goal processing, or something 
else. Importantly, none of these alternative activities are mind wandering. We also 
suggest a possible error theory to explain away self-reports of intentional mind 
wandering. What we propose is an outline of a larger case that could be made to 
explaining the evidence for intentional mind wandering within the confines of the 
Standard View.  
 Some researchers have found different associations of trait- and state-level 
variables between unintentional and intentional mind wandering and, thus, argue for the 
theoretical usefulness of distinguishing between the two. For instance, Seli, Risko, & 
Smilek (2016) asked participants to complete either a difficult or easy version of the 
Sustained Attention to Response Task, a task that requires participants to respond to 
frequently presented items and withhold a response for infrequently presented target 
items. Mind wandering was measured with randomly distributed thought probes that 
prompted participants to report whether they were unintentionally or intentionally mind 
wandering at a given moment. Results showed that when collapsing across the two types 
of mind wandering, there was no significant difference in the overall rates of mind 
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wandering between difficult and easy conditions. However, when analyzing intentional 
and unintentional mind wandering separately, the authors found: (1) higher rates of 
reported unintentional mind wandering than intentional mind wandering; (2) higher rates 
of reported intentional mind wandering in the easy-SART condition relative to the 
difficult-SART condition, and; (3) significantly higher proportion of reported 
unintentional mind wandering in the difficult-SART condition relative to the easy-SART 
condition. One significant conclusion that Seli and colleagues draw from this is: “…had 
we ignored the distinction between intentional and unintentional mind wandering, we 
would have drawn the incorrect conclusion that mind wandering remains unchanged 
across conditions” (Seli, Risko, & Smilek, 2016: 688). 
 This data, however, is consistent with a weaker conclusion: in studies of mind 
wandering researchers must distinguish mind wandering from other, intentional mental 
activities that share certain superficial properties of mind wandering. Seli and colleagues 
show that participants sometimes deliberately distract themselves during a task, whereas 
other times they mind wander. And researchers should be careful not to lump mind 
wandering and these other deliberate forms of distraction together in their analyses. The 
decision to label this deliberate form of distraction intentional mind wandering is a 
theoretical choice that Seli and colleagues impose on the data. 
 What might this other form mental activity be? We suspect that there is no single 
answer to this question. But a few examples reveal how one might explain purported 
instances of intentional mind wandering in terms of other well-defined psychological 
constructs (which constructs, we should note, do not themselves include or overlap with 
mind wandering). This provides the proponent of the Standard View with a template for 
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eliminating intentional mind wandering while accepting the work done under the banner 
of ‘intentional mind wandering’. 
 For example, consider a case where an individual chooses to think about the 
vacation she’s taking next month rather than the hedges she’s currently trimming. This 
might seem like an instance of intentional mind wandering. But an alternative description 
is available. This could be an instance of focused daydreaming. However, focused 
daydreaming is not a kind of mind wandering (see Dorsch, 2015 for an extended 
argument for distinguishing focused daydreaming and mind wandering). Moreover, 
research shows that intentional mind wandering correlates with significantly lower 
reports of vagueness when compared to unintentional mind wandering (Seli et al., 2017: 
152). This supports our claim that some purported instances of intentional mind 
wandering can be re-described as focused daydreaming. 
 This does not imply, however, that every purported instance of intentional mind 
wandering is actually an instance of focused daydreaming. We think that many purported 
instances of intentional mind wandering are actually instances of motivated task 
switching. Consider, for example, a case where somebody is taking a road trip through 
central Idaho. They currently find themselves driving down a long, flat stretch of 
highway. This individual might stop consciously attending to the road and begin thinking 
about a paper she’s writing or a talk that she’s giving in a few weeks. Again, this appears 
to be a case of intentional mind wandering, but an interpretation compatible with the 
Standard View is available. 
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 Repeated performance of some activity makes that activity overlearned. Here, we 
are thinking of tasks as activities that executive resources (such as attention and cognitive 
control) supervise (Mole, 2011: 51). Christopher Mole (2011: 62) explains: 
It is typically harder to give sustained attention to familiar, well-
understood tasks than it is to give attention to tasks that are poorly 
understood. The thought…is that giving one’s attention to a well-
understood task involves marshalling a large set of resources, just because 
the task is so well-understood. 
 
When there are too many available resources, executing an activity as a task (where this 
implies guided, attentive performance) can hurt performance. Consider, for instance, that 
tying one’s shoes or walking up stairs is more difficult when one focuses on every 
component of the activity. Thus, there is some incentive to switch tasks when one is 
performing an overlearned activity.  
 In other cases, there is no reason to engage in focused thinking when performing 
an overlearned activity. When an activity is easy or there is a history of successfully 
performing the activity without difficult thinking, there is some incentive to shift one’s 
focus to something else that might benefit from focused, engaged thinking (see Boureau, 
Sokol-Hessner, & Daw, 2015; Kool, Gershman, & Cushman, 2017). This might be 
what’s happening in the driving case. The individual has a long history of driving 
successfully without thinking very hard about driving, the roads are flat, the traffic is 
thin, and visibility is good. So, there is some motivation to shift the focus of one’s 
thinking to something else—such as a paper or presentation—that could use some 
focused attention. 
 More formally, we suggest that an agent (S) can focus on one of several different 
task sets (T1, T2,…,Tn) at any given time (e.g., focus on driving, focus on the paper, focus 
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on the presentation, etc.). The marginal utility of focusing on a given task set decreases 
monotonically over time. So, S might be focused on T1, though the cost of focusing on T1 
outweighs the benefits of focusing on T1 relative to the associated costs and benefits of 
focusing on either T2 or Tn. At this point, S might decide to shift focus from T1 to T2 
(e.g., shifting focus from driving to paper writing). This might appear to be a case of 
intentional mind wandering, as there is a decision to shift focus away from an ongoing 
activity. But this is just an instance of motivated task switching, where S swaps out T1 for 
T2 or Tn. In this situation, the motivated task switching is not mind wandering, because 
the individual is engaged in focused, goal-directed cognition (thinking about the paper or 
the presentation). 
 This proposal is consistent with other theoretical explanations of intentional mind 
wandering as a kind of strategic cognition. For example, Seli and colleagues explain that 
intentional mind wandering manifests a strategic allocation of psychological resources 
because such allocations enable more locally beneficial forms of thinking (Seli et al., 
2018-a). Another similar proposal is the current concerns hypothesis, which claims that 
mind wandering occurs when focusing on internal goals and desires has a higher 
incentive value than attending to the external environment (Klinger, 1987; Klinger, Barta, 
& Maxeiner, 1980; Klinger, Gregoire, & Barta, 1973). The key distinction that we make 
here is that when a person intends to think about their internal or long-term goals, she is 
switching tasks from the experimental paradigm to an internally-oriented task set. One 
difference, then, between mind wandering and task switching is this. When an agent task 
switches from T1 to T2, the agent reorganizes the structure of her activity such that she is 
primarily disposed to be attentive toward different kinds of consideration that are more 
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relevant to T2 and correspondingly less disposed to be attentive toward considerations 
that are relevant to T1. When an agent mind wanders from T1 to T2, the agent is still 
primarily disposed to be attentive to considerations relevant to T1 and will feel distracted 
when she becomes aware of her mind wandering.10 
 We are not claiming that every purported instance of intentional mind wandering 
is either an instance of focused daydreaming or motivated task switching. The 
aforementioned examples suggest how one might interpret apparent cases of intentional 
mind wandering as instances of other well-defined psychological categories. This is the 
heart of the eliminativist approach to intentional mind wandering that the Standard View 
must adopt. 
 One problem with rejecting intentional mind wandering is that people report 
intentional mind wandering when prompted to distinguish between goal-directed 
thinking, unintentional, and intentional mind wandering (e.g., Seli, Carriere, & Smilek, 
2015; Seli, Risko, & Smilek, 2016; Seli et al., 2017; Seli et al., 2018-b). Similar findings 
come from studies of mind wandering in daily life, where people self-report letting their 
minds wander on purpose (Kane et al., 2007). Additionally, there is evidence from 
experimental philosophy that suggests the folk concept of mind wandering recognizes 
something like intentional mind wandering (Irving et al., Manuscript). The Standard 
View, then, cannot just re-interpret purported instances of intentional mind wandering. 
The view must also include some kind of error theory to explain away people’s 
judgments about their own mind wandering. We do not have enough space to develop a 
	
10 Our explanation of the difference between task-switching and mind wandering relies heavily on the 
notion of guidance developed in Irving (2016). We think that there is more to say about the relative utility 
functions that describe the values of different task sets and how those figure into an explanation of mind 
wandering on the Standard View. That, however, is an issue that requires separate treatment. 
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fully adequate error theory. We simply sketch an outline of one such theory, noting that 
the Standard View owes an error theory about why people are systematically mistaken 
about the existence of intentional mind wandering. 
 In one of the earliest daily-life studies of mind wandering, Kane and colleagues 
(2007) found that people frequently reported letting their minds wander on purpose. 
Consistent with this, people did not report feeling surprised by their mind wandering 
(Kane et al., 2007: 618; see also Kane et al., 2017). One issue with these results is that 
people might exhibit a social desirability bias in their responses (see Weinstein, 2018). 
For example, people might have a desirability to manifest control to others, which would 
explain why they respond that their mind wandering is not surprising and that their mind 
wandering happens on purpose. Additionally, as we argue below, judgments of 
intentional mind wandering may reflect post hoc inferences anchored to properties of 
one’s experience that are not constitutive of mind wandering. 
 One factor that might explain reports of intentional mind wandering in laboratory 
settings is that participants have a mistaken conception of mind wandering. In an 
experimental context, participants are told to perform the task provided by the 
experimenter. Thus, when participants are asked whether their minds were wandering, 
they might categorize any thoughts unrelated to the researcher-imposed task as mind 
wandering. However, it might be the case that participants chose to switch from the 
researcher-imposed task to an internally-oriented task (perhaps due to boredom or mental 
fatigue or some other reason). In this case, participants report intentional mind wandering 
because they chose to think about something unrelated to the experimental task. Notice, 
however, that this might not be a case of mind wandering, as it is possible for the 
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participant to engage in focused thinking about something unrelated to the experimental 
task. 
 This explanation is consistent with our picture of motivated task switching 
presented earlier. Experimental tasks are often boring, and there is little incentive for 
participants to fully focus on the task. Because there are likely other things that are more 
rewarding for the individual to think about, there is a higher likelihood that participants 
will choose to shift the focus of attention to something else. We suggest that participants 
are also likely to label as ‘intentional mind wandering’ any thoughts that are unrelated to 
the researcher-imposed task even when those thoughts are guided toward a single task or 
topic. This mistake might be one source of self-reported intentional mind wandering. 
 As we noted before, partisans of the Standard View need to have something to say 
about the apparent existence of intentional mind wandering. We have gestured at some 
points that can be made to start explaining away the evidence that seems to weigh in 
favor of intentional mind wandering. 
  
5. Conclusion 
Our argument generates a surprising result: either the Standard View is mistaken or there 
is no such thing as intentional mind wandering. We think that the argument has 
implications for many of the major theories of mind wandering—including Dynamic and 
Family Resemblance views—but the biggest implication is for the Standard View. The 
Standard View is overwhelmingly popular in cognitive science. We have suggested that 
researchers either drop the Standard View or begin working on ways to explain away the 
evidence for intentional mind wandering. Either way, as philosophical interest in mind 
	 19	
wandering increases, this represents an exciting frontier in constructing a theory of mind 
wandering. 
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